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On the performance analysis of resilient
networked control systems under replay attacks
Minghui Zhu and Sonia Martı´nez
Abstract
This paper studies a resilient control problem for discrete-time, linear time-invariant systems sub-
ject to state and input constraints. State measurements and control commands are transmitted over a
communication network and could be corrupted by adversaries. In particular, we consider the replay
attackers who maliciously repeat the messages sent from the operator to the actuator. We propose a
variation of the receding-horizon control law to deal with the replay attacks and analyze the resulting
system performance degradation. A class of competitive (resp. cooperative) resource allocation problems
for resilient networked control systems is also investigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent advances of information technologies have boosted the emergence of networked
control systems where information networks are tightly coupled to physical processes and human
intervention. Such sophisticated systems create a wealth of new opportunities at the expense of
increased complexity and system vulnerability. In particular, malicious attacks in the cyber world
are a current practice and a major concern for the deployment of networked control systems.
Thus, the ability to analyze their consequences becomes of prime importance in order to enhance
the resilience of these new-generation control systems.
This paper considers a single-loop remotely-controlled system, in which the plant, together
with a sensor and an actuator, and the system operator are spatially distributed and connected
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2via a communication network. In particular, state measurements are communicated from the
sensor to the system operator through the network; then, the generated control commands are
transmitted to the actuator through the same network. This model is an abstraction of a variety of
existing networked control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
networks in critical infrastructures (e.g., power systems and water management systems) and
remotely piloted unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The objective of the paper is to design and
analyze resilient controllers against replay attacks.
Literature review. Recently, the cyber security of control systems has received increasing
attention. The research effort has been devoted to studying two aspects: attack detection and
attack-resilient control. Regarding attack detection, a particular class of cyber attacks, namely
false data injection, against state estimation is studied in [26], [29], [30]. The paper [19]
studies the detection of the replay attacks, which maliciously repeat transmitted data. In the
context of multi-agent systems, the papers of [25], [28] determine conditions under which
consensus multi-agent systems can detect misbehaving agents. As for attack-resilient control, the
papers [2], [32], [33] are devoted to studying deception attacks, where attackers intentionally
modify measurements and control commands. Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks destroy the data
availability in control systems and are tackled in recent papers [1], [3], [4], [9]. More specifically,
the papers [1], [9] formulate finite-horizon LQG control problems as dynamic zero-sum games
between the controller and the jammer. In [3], the authors investigate the security independency
in infinite-horizon LQG against DoS attacks, and fully characterize the equilibrium of the induced
game. In our paper [35], a distributed receding-horizon control law is proposed to ensure that
vehicles reach the desired formation despite the DoS and replay attacks.
The problems of control and estimation over unreliable communication channels have re-
ceived considerable attention over the last decade [12]. Key issues include band-limited chan-
nels [15], [22], quantization [6], [21], packet dropout [10], [13], [27], delay [5] and sampling [23].
Receding-horizon networked control is studied in [7], [11], [24] for package dropouts and
in [14], [16] for transmission delays. Package dropouts and DoS attacks (resp. transmission
delays and replay attacks) cause similar affects to control systems. So the existing receding-
horizon control approaches exhibit the robustness to certain classes of DoS and replay attacks
under their respective assumptions. However, none of these papers characterizes the performance
degradation of receding-horizon control induced by the communication unreliability.
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3Contributions. We study a variation of the receding-horizon control under the replay attacks.
A set of sufficient conditions are provided to ensure asymptotical and exponential stability. More
importantly, we derive a simple and explicit relation between the infinite-horizon cost and the
computing and attacking horizons. By using such relation, we characterize a class of competitive
(resp. cooperative) resource allocation problems for resilient networked control systems as convex
games (resp. programs). The preliminary results are published in [33] where receding-horizon
control is used to deal with a class of deception attacks. The technical relations between this
paper and [33] will be explained at the very beginning of Section V.
II. ATTACK-RESILIENT RECEDING-HORIZON CONTROL
A. Description of the controlled system
Consider the following discrete-time, linear time-invariant dynamic system:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k), (1)
where x(k) ∈ Rn is the system state, and u(k) ∈ Rm is the system input at time k ≥ 0. The
matrices A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rn×m represent the state and the input matrix, respectively. States
and inputs of system (1) are constrained to be in some sets; i.e., x(k) ∈ X and u(k) ∈ U , for all
k ≥ 0, where 0 ∈ X ⊆ Rn and 0 ∈ U ⊆ Rm. The quantities ‖x(k)‖2P and ‖u(k)‖2Q are running
state and input costs, respectively, for some P and Q positive-definite and symmetric matrices.
We assume the following holds for the system:
Assumption 2.1: (Stabilizability) The pair (A,B) is stabilizable. •
This assumption ensures the existence of K such that the spectrum σ(A¯) is strictly inside the
unit circle where A¯ , A + BK. In the remainder of the paper, u = Kx will be referred to as
the auxiliary controller. We then impose the following condition on the constraint sets.
Assumption 2.2: (Constraint sets) The sets X and U are convex and Kx ∈ U for x ∈ X .•
B. The closed-loop system with the replay attacker
System (1) together with the sensor and the actuator are spatially separated from the operator.
These entities are connected through communication channels. In the network, there is a replay
attacker who maliciously repeats the messages delivered from the operator to the actuator. In
particular, the adversary is associated with a memory whose state is denoted by Ma(k). If a replay
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4attack is launched at time k, the adversary executes the following: (i) erases the data sent from the
operator; (ii) sends previous data stored in her memory, Ma(k), to the actuator; (iii) maintains
the state of the memory; i.e., Ma(k + 1) = Ma(k). In this case, we use ϑ(k) = 1 to indicate
the occurrence of a replay attack. If the attacker keeps idle at time k, then data is intercepted,
say Υ, sent from the operator to plant, and stored it in memory; i.e., Ma(k + 1) = Υ. In this
case, ϑ(k) = 0 and u is successfully received by the actuator. Without loss of any generality,
we assume that ϑ(−1) = ϑ(0) = 0.
We now define the variable s(k) with initial state s(0) = s(−1) = 0 to indicate the consecutive
number of the replay attacks. If ϑ(k) = 1, then s(k) = s(k − 1) + 1; otherwise, s(k) = 0. So,
the quantity s(k) represents the number of consecutive attacks up to time k.
A replay attack requires spending certain amount of energy. We assume that the energy of the
adversary is limited, and adversary i is only able to launch at most S ≥ 1 consecutive attacks.
This assumption is formalized as follows:
Assumption 2.3: (Maximum number of consecutive attacks) There is an integer S ≥ 1
such that maxk≥0 s(k) ≤ S. •
Fig. 1. The closed-loop system
Replay attacks have been successfully used by the virus attack of Stuxnet [8], [18]. This class
of attacks can be easily detected by attaching a time stamp to each control command. In the
remainder of the paper, we assume that the attacks can always be detected and focus on the
design and analysis of resilient controllers against them.
C. Attack-resilient receding-horizon control law
Here we propose a variation of the receding-horizon control in; e.g. [17], [16], to deal with
the replay attacks. Our attack-resilient receding-horizon control law, (for short, AR-RHC)
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5is stated in Algorithm 1. In particular, at each time instant, the plant stores the whole control
sequence which will be used in response to future attacks. The terminal state cost is chosen
to coincide with the running state cost. This is instrumental for the analysis of performance
degradation in Theorem 2.1.
Algorithm 1 The attack-resilient receding-horizon control law
Initialization: The following steps are first performed by the operator:
1: Choose K so that σ(A¯) is strictly inside the unit circle.
2: Choose Q¯ = Q¯T > 0 and obtain P¯ by solving the following Lyapunov equation:
A¯T P¯ A¯− P¯ = −Q¯. (2)
3: Choose a constant c > 0 such that X0 , {x ∈ Rn | ‖x‖2P¯ ≤ c} ⊆ X .
Iteration: At each k ≥ 0, the operator, actuator and sensor execute the following steps:
1: The operator solves the following N-horizon quadratic program, namely N-QP, parameter-
ized by x(k) ∈ X:
min
u(k)∈Rm×N
N−1∑
τ=0
(
‖x(k + τ |k)‖2P + ‖u(k + τ |k)‖
2
Q
)
+ ‖x(k +N |k)‖2P ,
s.t. x(k + τ + 1|k) = Ax(k + τ |k) +Bu(k + τ |k),
x(k|k) = x(k), x(k + τ + 1|k) ∈ X0, u(k + τ |k) ∈ U, 0 ≤ τ ≤ N − 1,
obtains the solution u(k) , [u(k|k), · · · , u(k +N − 1|k)], and sends it to the actuator.
2: If s(k) = 0, the actuator receives u(k), sets Mp(k+1) = u(k), implements u(k|k), and the
sensor sends x(k + 1) to the operator. If s(k) ≥ 1, the actuator implements u(k|k − s(k))
in Mp(k), sets Mp(k + 1) = Mp(k), and the sensor sends x(k + 1) to the operator.
3: Repeat for k = k + 1.
In what follows, we present the results characterizing the stability and infinite-horizon cost
induced by AR-RHC. See Table I, for the main notations employed, and Section V for the
complete proof. Notice that the following property holds:
λmin(P )
φN
=
λmin(P )
λmax(P +KTQK)
λmin(P¯ )
λmax(P¯ )
(1− λ)
(1− λN+1)
< 1.
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6TABLE I
MAIN NOTATIONS USED IN THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS
λmax(R) (resp. λmin(R)) the maximum (resp. minimum) eigenvalue of matrix R
λ , 1−
λmax(Q¯)
λmin(P¯ )
positive constant, λ ∈ (0, 1), see [20],
defined with Q¯, P¯ introduced in AR-RHC
φN ,
λmax(P¯ )λmax(P +K
TQK)
λmin(P¯ )
(1− λN+1)
1− λ
positive constant defined for all N > 0,
with Q¯, P¯ , and K introduced in AR-RHC
φ∞ ,
λmax(P¯ )λmax(P +K
TQK)
λmin(P¯ )(1− λ)
positive constant defined with Q¯, P¯ , and K
introduced in AR-RHC
αN ,
λmax(K
TQK + A¯TPA¯)
λmin(P )
×
N−1∏
κ=0
(1−
λmin(P )
φκ+1
)
positive constant defined for all N > 0,
with A¯ and K introduced in AR-RHC, and λ introduced here
ρN , (1 + αN−1)(1−
λmin(P )
φN
) a discount factor
W (x) , ‖x‖2
P¯ matrix P¯ is the solution to Lyapunov equation (2)
VN the optimal value function of N -QP
where λ and φN are defined in Table I. On the other hand, for αN in Table I, αN ց 0 as
N ր +∞, and φN is strictly increasing in N and upper bounded by φ∞. Then, given any
integer S ≥ 1, there is a smallest integer N∗(S) ≥ S such that for all N ≥ N∗(S), it holds that:
γN,S , (1−
λmin(P )
φ∞
)max{(1 + αN−S−1), (1 + αN−1)
N−1∏
ℓ=N−S
(1 + αℓ)} < 1.
Analogously, given any integer S ≥ 1, there is a smallest integer Nˆ∗(S) ≥ S such that for all
N ≥ Nˆ∗(S), it holds that
γˆN,S , (1−
λmin(P )
φ∞
)2(1 + αN−1)(1 + αN−2)
×
(
max
s∈{1,··· ,S}
s∏
ℓ=2
(1−
λmin(P )
φ∞
)(1 + αN−ℓ−1)
) N−1∏
ℓ=N−S
(1 + αℓ) < 1.
One can easily verify Nˆ∗(S) ≤ N∗(S). The following theorem characterizes the stability and
infinite-horizon cost of system (1) under AR-RHC where Vℓ(x) represents the value of the ℓ-QP
parameterized by x ∈ X .
Theorem 2.1: (Stability and infinite-horizon cost) Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 hold.
1) (Exponential stability) Suppose N ≥ max{N∗(S) + 1, S + 1}. Then system (1) under
AR-RHC is exponentially stable when starting from X0 with a rate of γN,S in the sense
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7that VN−s(k−1)(x(k)) ≤ γkN,SVN(x(0)). In addition, the infinite-horizon cost of system (1)
under AR-RHC is bounded above by 1
1−γN,S
VN(x(0)).
2) (Asymptotic stability) If N ≥ max{Nˆ∗(S) + 1, S + 1}, then system (1) under AR-RHC
is asymptotically stable when starting from X0.
Remark 2.1: AR-RHC with Theorem 2.1 can be readily extended to several scenarios, in-
cluding DoS attacks, measurement attacks and the combinations of such attacks. If the adversary
launches a DoS attack on control commands, the actuator receives nothing and then performs
Step 3 in AR-RHC. The adversary may produce the replay attacks on the measurements sent
from the sensor to the operator. If this happens, then the operator does not send anything to the
actuator and the actuator performs Step 3 in AR-RHC. •
III. DISCUSSION AND SIMULATIONS
A. Extensions
AR-RHC with Theorem 2.1 can be readily extended to several scenarios, including DoS
attacks, measurement attacks and the combinations of such attacks. If the adversary launches
a DoS attack on control commands, the actuator receives nothing and then performs Step 3 in
AR-RHC. The adversary may produce the replay attacks on the measurements sent from the
sensor to the operator. If this happens, then the operator does not send anything to the actuator
and the actuator performs Step 3 in AR-RHC.
B. Explicit upper bounds on N∗(S) and Nˆ∗(S)
Consider S ≥ 2 and let χ , (1− λmin(P )
φ∞
) and ψ , λmax(K
TQK+A¯TPA¯)
λmin(P )
. Note that
γN,S ≤ (1−
λmin(P )
φ∞
)(1 + αN−1)
N−1∏
ℓ=N−S−1
(1 + αℓ)
≤ χ(1 + αN−S−1)
S+2 ≤ βN,S , χ(1 + ψχ
N−S−1)S+2. (3)
So it suffices to find N such that βN,S < 1. The relation βN,S < 1 is equivalent to the following:
N − S − 1 >
ln
(
1
ψ
(χ−
1
S+2 − 1)
)
lnχ
=
ln(χ−
1
S+2 − 1)− lnψ
lnχ
.
Hence, an explicit upper bound on N∗(S) is ΠE(S) , S + 1 + ln(χ
−
1
S+2−1)−lnψ
lnχ
.
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8We now move to find an explicit upper bound on Nˆ∗(S). Note that
γˆN,S ≤ (1−
λmin(P )
φ∞
)2(1 + αN−1)(1 + αN−2)
(
max
s∈{1,··· ,S}
s∏
ℓ=2
(1−
λmin(P )
φ∞
)(1 + αN−ℓ−1)
) N−1∏
ℓ=N−S
(1 + αℓ)
≤ (1−
λmin(P )
φ∞
)S+1(1 + αN−1)(1 + αN−2)(1 + αN−S−1)
S−1
N−1∏
ℓ=N−S
(1 + αℓ)
≤ (1−
λmin(P )
φ∞
)S+1(1 + αN−S−1)
2S+1 = χS+1(1 + ψχN−S−1)2S+1.
So, an explicit upper bound on Nˆ∗(S) is ΠA(S) , S + 1 + ln(χ
−
S+1
2S+1−1)−lnψ
lnχ
. This pair of
upper bounds clearly demonstrate that a higher computational complexity; i.e., a larger N , is
caused by a larger S, indicating that the adversary is less energy constrained. On the other hand,
the second term in ΠA(S) approaches a constant as S goes to infinity. So ΠA(S) can be upper
bounded by an affine function. However, the second term in ΠE(S) dominates when S is large.
That is, exponential stability demands a much higher cost than asymptotic stability when S is
large.
C. A reverse scenario
Reciprocally, for any horizon N ≥ 1, there is a largest integer S∗(N) ≤ N − 1 (resp.
Sˆ∗(N) ≤ N − 1) such that for all S ≤ S∗(N) (resp. S ≤ Sˆ∗(N)), it holds that γN,S < 1 (resp.
γˆN,S < 1). Theorem 2.1 still applies to this reverse scenario and characterizes the “security level”
or “amount of resilience” that the proposed receding-horizon control algorithm possesses.
D. Optimal resilience management
The analysis of Theorem 2.1 quantifies the cost and constraints that allow the AR-RHC
algorithm to work despite consecutive attacks under limited computation capabilities. These
metrics can be used for optimal resilience management of a network as follows.
As [3], we consider a set of players V , {1, · · · , N} where the players share a communication
network and each of them is associated with a decoupled dynamic system:
xi(k + 1) = Aixi(k) +Biui(k). (4)
Each player i implements his own AR-RHC with horizon Ni. The notations in the previous
sections can be defined analogously for each player and the set of the notations of player i will
be indexed by i.
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9By (3), we associate player i with the following cost function:
Ci(M) =
(
1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i
)S(1TM)+1
+
1
2
aiM
2
i , (5)
where Mi ∈ [Mi,min,Mi,max] ⊂ R>0 is the security investment of player i, ai ∈ R>0 is a weight
on the security cost the and 1 is the vector with N ones. The non-negative real value S(1TM)
represents the security level given the investment vector M of all players, where S : R≥0 → R≥0
is convex, non-decreasing, and smooth. We assume that each player has a fixed computational
power, and so Ni is fixed. The players need to make the investment such that
S(1TM) ≤ min
i∈V
S∗i (Ni). (6)
Remark 3.1: Note that S is an integer in (3). In (5) and (6), we use the real value of S(1TM)
as an approximation. •
We now compute the first-order partial derivative of Ci as follows:
∂Ci
∂Mi
= − ln(1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i )(1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i )
S(1TM)+1(lnχi)ψiχ
Ni−Si(M)
i (
∂S
∂y
)2 + aiMi
where we use the shorthand y , 1TM . With this, we further derive the second-order partial
derivative as follows:
∂2Ci
∂M2i
= ψ2i (lnχi)
2χ
2(Ni−Si(1TM))
i (1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i )
S(1TM)(
∂S
∂y
)3 + ai
+ (ln(1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i ))
2(1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i )
S(1TM)+1(ψi lnχiχ
Ni−Si(1TM)
i )
2(
∂S
∂y
)4
+ ln(1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i )(1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i )
S(1TM)+1ψi(lnχi)
2χ
Ni−Si(1TM)
i (
∂S
∂y
)3
+ 2(ln(1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i ))
2(1 + ψiχ
Ni−S(1TM)
i )
S(1TM)+1ψi(− lnχi)χ
Ni−Si(1TM)
i
∂S
∂y
∂2S
∂y2
.
Recall that χi ∈ (0, 1] and S is non-decreasing and convex. So ∂
2Ci
∂M2i
≥ 0 and Ci is convex in
Mi. Analogously, one can show that Ci is convex in M .
1) Competitive resource allocation scenario: Consider a resilience management game, where
each player i minimizes his cost Ci(M), subject to the common constraint (6) and his private
constraint Mi ∈ [Mi,min,Mi,max] ⊂ R>0. Since Ci and S are convex in Mi, then the game
is a generalized convex game. The distributed algorithms in [31] can be directly utilized to
numerically compute a Nash equilibrium of the resilience management game, and the algorithms
in [31] are able to tolerate transmission delays and packet dropouts.
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Remark 3.2: The paper [3] considers a set of identical and independent networked control
systems and each of them aims to solve an infinite-horizon LQG problem. The authors study
a different security game where the decisions of each player are binary, participating in the
security investment or not. •
2) Cooperative resource allocation scenario: Consider a resilience management optimization
problem, where the players aim to collectively minimize
∑
i∈V Ci(M), subject to the global
constraint (6) and the private constraint Mi ∈ [Mi,min,Mi,max] ⊂ R>0. Since Ci and S are
convex, then the problem is a convex program. The distributed algorithms in [34] can be directly
exploited to numerically compute a global minimizer of this problem, and the algorithms in [34]
are robust to the dynamic changes of inter-player topologies.
E. Simulations
In this section, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the performance of our algorithm.
The set of system parameters are given as follows:
A =

 2 1
1 2

 , B =

 2
1

 , K = [−3.25 − 3], P = I, Q = 1,
Q¯ = I, P¯ =

 25.6667 13.3333
13.3333 8.2963

 , c = 100, umax = 500.
Figure 2 shows the temporal evolution of ‖x(k)‖2 under three attacking horizons S = 0, 2, 5.
One can see that a larger S induces a longer time to converge, and larger oscillation before
reaching the equilibrium. In our simulations, a smaller horizon N = 15 than the one determined
theoretically is already sufficient to achieve system stabilization.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied a resilient control problem where a linear dynamic system is
subject to the replay and DoS attacks. We have proposed a variation of the receding-horizon
control law for the operator and analyzed system stability and performance degradation. We have
also studied a class of competitive (resp. cooperative) resource allocation problems for resilient
networked control systems. Extension to multi-agent systems will be considered in the future.
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Fig. 2. The trajectories of ‖x(k)‖2 under the attack-resilient receding-horizon control algorithm
V. APPENDIX: TECHNICAL PROOFS
The proofs toward Theorem 2.1 are collected in this section. In particular, the proofs for
the intermediate lemmas are based on the corresponding results in our previous paper [33] on
deception attacks. The proofs for the main theorem are new and not included in [33]. In the
proof of Theorem 2.1, we choose VN−s(k−1)(x(k)) as a Lyapunov function candidate. To analyze
its convergence, we first establish several instrumental properties of VN , including monotonicity,
diminishing rations with respect to N and decreasing property.
Recall the definitions of λ, αN , φN , and φ∞ summarized in Table I. It follows from [20] that
λ ∈ (0, 1), and clearly, 1 ≤ φN ≤ φ∞ for any N ∈ Z>0. Observe that the following holds for
any κ ∈ Z>0:
λmin(P )
φκ+1
=
λmin(P )
λmax(P +KTQK)
λmin(P¯ )
λmax(P¯ )
1− λ
1− λκ+2
≥
λmin(P )
λmax(P +KTQK)
λmin(P¯ )
λmax(P¯ )
(1− λ) ∈ (0, 1).
This ensures the monotonicity of αN and, moreover, that αN ց 0 as N ր +∞.
We show the forward invariance property of system (1) in X0 under Kx.
Lemma 5.1 (Forward invariance in X0): The set X0 is forward invariant for system (1)
under the auxiliary controller Kx with the control constraint U ; i.e., for any x ∈ X0, it holds
that u = Kx ∈ U and A¯x ∈ X0.
Proof: The differences of W along the trajectories of the dynamics (1) under u(k) = Kx(k),
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x(k) = x can be characterized by:
W (x(k + 1))−W (x) = ‖A¯x(k + 1)‖2P¯ − ‖x(k)‖
2
P¯ = −‖x‖
2
Q¯ ≤ −λmin(Q¯)‖x‖
2, (7)
where W (x), A¯, P¯ and Q¯ are given in Table I, and in the second equality we apply the Lyapunov
equation (2). Since Q¯ > 0, then W (x(k+1)) ≤W (x). Since x belongs to X0, so does x(k+1).
Since X0 ⊆ X , we know that u(k) ∈ U by Assumption 2.2. The forward invariance property of
X0 for system (1) follows.
On the other hand, one can see that the N-QP parameterized by x ∈ X0 has at least one
solution generated by the auxiliary controller.
Lemma 5.2 (Feasibility of the N-QP): For any x ∈ X0, consider system (1) with x(k|k) =
x and u(k + τ |k) = Kx(k + τ |k), for 0 ≤ τ ≤ N − 1. Then, u(k) is a feasible solution to the
N-QP parameterized by x(k) ∈ X0.
Proof: It is a direct result of Lemma 5.1 and Assumption 2.2.
The following lemma demonstrates that VN is bounded above and below by two quadratic
functions, respectively.
Lemma 5.3: (Positive-definite and decrescent properties of VN ) The function VN is quadrat-
ically bounded above and below as λmin(P )‖x‖2 ≤ VN (x) ≤ φN‖x‖2 for any x ∈ X0.
Proof: Consider any x ∈ X0. It is easy to see that VN(x) ≥ λmin(P )‖x‖2, and thus positive
definiteness of VN follows. We now proceed to show that VN is decrescent. In order to simplify
the notations in the proof, we will drop the dependency on time k in what follows. Toward this
end, we let {x(τ)}τ≥0 be the solution produced by the system x(τ + 1) = A¯x(τ), that is, the
closed-loop system solution of the dynamics (1) under the auxiliary controller Kx, with initial
state x(0) = x ∈ X0. We denote x(τ |0) ≡ x(τ) and u(τ |0) ≡ u(τ). Recall the estimate (7):
W (x(τ + 1)) ≤W (x(τ))− λmin(Q¯)‖x(τ)‖
2 ≤W (x(τ))−
λmax(Q¯)
λmax(P¯ )
W (x(τ)), (8)
where we use the property that λmin(P¯ )‖x‖2 ≤W (x) ≤ λmax(P¯ )‖x‖2. It follows from Lemma 5.2
that the sequence of control commands u(τ) = Kx(τ) for 0 ≤ τ ≤ N − 1 consists of a feasible
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solution to the N-QP parameterized by x ∈ X0. Then we achieve the following on VN(x):
VN(x) ≤
N−1∑
τ=0
(
‖x(τ)‖2P + ‖Kx(τ)‖
2
Q
)
+ ‖x(N)‖2P
≤
N−1∑
τ=0
λmax(P +K
TQK)‖x(τ)‖2 + λmax(P )‖x(N)‖
2
≤
λmax(P +K
TQK)
λmin(P¯ )
N−1∑
τ=0
W (x(τ)) +
λmax(P )
λmin(P¯ )
W (x(N)). (9)
Substituting inequality (8) into (9), we obtain the following estimates on VN(x):
VN(x) ≤
λmax(P +K
TQK)
λmin(P¯ )
W (x)
N−1∑
τ=0
λτ +
λmax(P )
λmin(P¯ )
W (x)λN
≤
λmax(P¯ )λmax(P +K
TQK)
λmin(P¯ )
1− λN+1
1− λ
‖x‖2.
where we use the fact λ = 1− λmax(Q¯)
λmax(P¯ )
∈ (0, 1) in [20]. The decrescent property of VN immediately
follows from the above relations.
Next, one can show that for any x ∈ X0, VN(x) does not decrease as N increases.
Lemma 5.4 (Monotonicity of VN ): The optimal value function VN is monotonic in N ; i.e.,
for any x ∈ X0, VN ′(x) ≤ VN(x) for N ′ < N .
Proof: Consider N ′ < N , and denote by JN and JN ′ the objective functions of the N-
QP and the N ′-QP, respectively. Let uN be a solution to the N-QP parameterized by x, with
uN = [u(0), . . . , u(N − 1)], and let uN ′ , with uN ′ = [u(0), . . . , u(N ′ − 1)], be a solution to the
N ′-QP parameterized by x ∈ X0. We construct u˜N ′ ∈ UN ′ , a truncated version of uN , in such
a way that u˜(k) = u(k) for 0 ≤ k ≤ N ′− 1. Since uN is a solution to the N-QP parameterized
by x, then one can show that u˜N ′ is a feasible solution to the N ′-QP parameterized by x. This
renders the following upper bound on VN ′(x):
VN ′(x) = JN ′(x,uN ′) ≤ JN ′(x, u˜N ′). (10)
Denote by xN , [x(0), · · · , x(N)] the corresponding trajectory to uN with initial state x(0) = x
and by x˜N ′ , [x˜(0), · · · , x˜N ′ ] the corresponding trajectory generated by the sequence of u˜N ′
with the initial state x˜(0) = x. Since u˜N ′ is a truncated version of uN , we have that x˜(k) = x(k)
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for 0 ≤ k ≤ N ′. Denote further u˜N ′ , [u˜(0), · · · , u˜(N ′ − 1)]. Then we have
JN ′(x, u˜N ′) =
N ′∑
k=1
(
‖x˜(k)‖2P + ‖u˜(k)‖
2
Q
)
+ ‖x˜(N ′)‖2P
=
N ′∑
k=1
(
‖x(k)‖2P + ‖u(k)‖
2
Q
)
+ ‖x(N ′)‖2P ≤
N∑
k=1
(
‖x(k)‖2P + ‖u(k)‖
2
Q
)
+ ‖x(N)‖2P = VN(x).
The combination of (10) and the above relation establishes that VN ′(x) ≤ VN(x) for x ∈ X0.
The following lemma formalizes that for any x ∈ X0, the difference between VN+1(x) and
VN(x) decreases as N increases by noting that VN(x) ≤ VN+1(x) and αN is strictly decreasing
in N , where VN+1 and VN are the optimal value functions for the (N + 1)-QP and the N-QP,
respectively. This property is referred to as the property of diminishing ratios of VN in N by
noting that αN ց 0 as N ր +∞.
Lemma 5.5: (The diminishing ratios of VN in N) The optimal value function VN is
diminishingly increasing in N in such a fashion that VN+1(x)−VN (x)
VN (x)
≤ αN for any x ∈ X0.
Proof: Let uN , with uN = [u(0), . . . , u(N − 1)], be a solution to the N-QP parameterized
by x ∈ X0. Let xN = [x(0), . . . , x(N)], x(0) = x, be the corresponding trajectory. Notice
that x(k) ∈ X0 for 0 ≤ k ≤ N . We construct an extended version u˜N+1 ∈ UN+1 of uN as
u˜N+1 = [u(0), . . . , u(N − 1), Kx(N)]. Since x(N) ∈ X0, then x˜(N + 1) := A¯x(N) ∈ X0 by
Lemma 5.1, implying that u˜N+1 consists of a feasible solution to the (N +1)-QP parameterized
by x. Then we establish the following upper bounds on VN+1(x):
VN+1(x) ≤ JN+1(x, u˜N+1) = JN(x,uN ) + ‖Kx(N)‖
2
Q + ‖x˜(N + 1)‖
2
P ≤ VN(x) + ς‖x(N)‖
2,
(11)
where ς := λmax(KTQK+A¯TPA¯). We now turn our attention to find a relation between ‖x(N)‖2
and VN(x). To achieve this, we will show the following holds for ℓ ∈ {0, · · · , N} by induction:
Vℓ(x(N − ℓ)) ≤
N−1∏
κ=ℓ
(1−
λmin(P )
φκ+1
)VN (x). (12)
It follows from Bellman’s principle of optimality that
VN(x) = ‖x(0)‖
2
P + ‖u(0)‖
2
Q + VN−1(x(1)).
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We can further see that VN(x)− VN−1(x(1)) is lower bounded in the following way:
VN(x)− VN−1(x(1)) ≥ λmin(P )‖x‖
2 ≥
λmin(P )
φN
VN(x), (13)
where we use the decrescent property in Lemma 5.3 in the last inequality. Rearrange terms
in (13) and it renders that (12) holds for ℓ = N − 1.
Assume that (12) holds for some ℓ+ 1 ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1}; i.e., the following holds:
Vℓ+1(x(N − ℓ− 1)) ≤
N−1∏
κ=ℓ+1
(1−
λmin(P )
φκ+1
)VN(x). (14)
Similar to (13), it follows from Bellman’s principle of optimality and Lemma 5.3 that
Vℓ+1(x(N − ℓ− 1))− Vℓ(x(N − ℓ)) ≥ λmin(P )‖x(N − ℓ− 1)‖
2 ≥
λmin(P )
φℓ+1
Vℓ+1(x(N − ℓ− 1)).
(15)
Combining (14) and (15) renders that
Vℓ(x(N − ℓ)) ≤ (1−
λmin(P )
φℓ+1
)Vℓ+1(x(N − ℓ− 1)) ≤
N−1∏
κ=ℓ
(1−
λmin(P )
φκ+1
)VN(x).
This implies (12) holds for ℓ. By induction, we conclude that (12) holds for ℓ ∈ {0, · · · , N}.
Let ℓ = 0 in (12), and we have that V0(x(N)) ≤
∏N−1
κ=0 (1 −
λmin(P )
φκ+1
)VN(x), implying that
‖x(N)‖2 ≤ 1
λmin(P )
∏N−1
κ=0 (1−
λmin(P )
φκ+1
)VN(x) by Lemma 5.3. By combining this relation with (11),
we obtain the desired relation between VN+1 and VN .
A relation between VN(x(k + 1|k)) and VN(x(k)) for x(k) ∈ X0, and x(k + 1|k) generated
through the N-QP, is found next.
Lemma 5.6 (Decreasing property of VN in X0): With x(k+1|k) generated through the N-
QP starting from x(k), the following decreasing property holds for any x(k) ∈ X0:
VN(x(k + 1|k)) ≤ ρNVN(x(k)).
Proof: With Lemma 5.3 and 5.5, we reach the following relation between VN(x(k + 1|k))
and VN(x(k)) for any x(k) ∈ X0:
VN(x(k + 1|k)) ≤ (1 + αN−1)VN−1(x(1)) ≤ (1 + αN−1)(VN(x(k))− ‖x(k)‖
2
P )
≤ (1 + αN−1)(VN(x(k))− λmin(P )‖x(k)‖
2) ≤ (1 + αN−1)(1−
λmin(P )
φN
)VN(x(k)),
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where Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.3 are used in the first and last inequalities, respectively, by
noting that x(k + 1|k) and x(k) in X0.
Proof of Theorem 2.1:
Proof: [Part 1: Exponential stability] Let us consider the first part of N ≥ max{N∗(S)+
1, S+1}. Recall that x(0) ∈ X0 and the state constraint X0 is enforced in the N-QP. Repeatedly
apply Lemma 5.2 and we have that x(k) ∈ X0 for all k ≥ 0. We now distinguish four cases:
Case 1: ϑ(k) = 1 and ϑ(k − 1) = 0. For this case, s(k) = 1, s(k − 1) = 0, and we have
VN−s(k)(x(k + 1)) = VN−1(x(k + 1)) ≤ ρN−1VN−1(x(k))
≤ ρN−1VN(x(k)) = ρN−1VN−s(k−1)(x(k)),
where the first inequality uses Lemma 5.6 and the principle of optimality, and the second one
exploits Lemma 5.4.
Case 2: ϑ(k) = ϑ(k − 1) = 0. Here, s(k) = s(k − 1) = 0. By Lemma 5.6, we have
VN−s(k)(x(k + 1)) = VN(x(k + 1)) ≤ ρNVN(x(k)) = ρNVN−s(k−1)(x(k)).
Case 3: ϑ(k) = ϑ(k − 1) = 1. Note that s(k) = s(k − 1) + 1, and then
VN−s(k)(x(k + 1)) ≤ ρN−s(k)VN−s(k)(x(k)) ≤ ρN−s(k)VN−s(k−1)(x(k)),
where the first inequality utilizes Lemmas 5.6 and the principle of optimality, and the second
one exploits Lemma 5.4.
Case 4: ϑ(k) = 0 and ϑ(k − 1) = 1. For this case, we have s(k) = 0, s(k − 1) ≥ 1 and thus
VN−s(k)(x(k + 1)) = VN(x(k + 1)) ≤ ρNVN(x(k)) ≤ ρN
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s(k−1)
(1 + αℓ)VN−s(k−1)(x(k)),
where the last inequality repeatedly applies Lemma 5.5.
Combine the above four cases, and it renders the following:
VN−s(k)(x(k + 1)) ≤ max{ max
s∈{1,··· ,S}
{ρN−s}, ρN max
s=1,··· ,S
{
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s
(1 + αℓ)}}VN−s(k−1)(x(k))
≤ γN,SVN−s(k−1)(x(k)). (16)
Since 0 < γN,S < 1, {VN−s(k−1)(x(k))} exponentially diminishes, and the following holds:
VN−s(k−1)(x(k)) ≤ γ
k
N,SVN(x(0)). (17)
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Recall N ≥ S+1. It follows from (17) that the infinite-horizon cost is characterized as follows:
+∞∑
k=0
(‖x(k)‖2P + ‖u(k)‖
2
Q) ≤
+∞∑
k=0
VN−s(k−1)(x(k)) ≤
+∞∑
k=0
γkN,SVN(x(0)) =
1
1− γN,S
VN(x(0)).
We then have finished the proofs for the first part.
[Part 2: Asymptotic stability] We now proceed to show the second part of N ≥ max{Nˆ∗(S)+
1, S+1}. Towards this end, we partition the time horizon {0, 1, · · · } into a sequence of subsets
{C1, A1, C2, A2, · · · } where Ci = {cLi , · · · , cUi } and Ai = {aLi , · · · , aUi } with for k ∈ Ci, then
ϑ(k) = 0; and k ∈ Ai, then ϑ(k) = 1. Note that cL0 = 0 and aLi = cUi + 1.
Case 1: k ∈ Ci \ {cLi }. Note that s(k) = s(k − 1) = 0 for all k ∈ Ci \ {cLi }. By Lemma 5.6,
we have
VN−s(k)(x(k + 1)) ≤ ρNVN−s(k−1)(x(k)), ∀k ∈ Ci \ {c
L
i }.
Case 2: k = aLi . Note that ϑ(aLi ) = 1 and ϑ(aLi − 1) = 0. By Case 1 in Part 1, we have
VN−s(aLi )(x(a
L
i + 1)) ≤ ρN−1VN−s(aLi −1)(x(a
L
i )).
Case 3: k = Ai \ {aLi }. Recall that ϑ(k) = 1 for k ∈ Ai. By repeating the result of Case 3 in
Part 1, we have
VN−s(k)(x(k + 1)) ≤
k−aLi∏
ℓ=2
ρN−ℓVN−s(aLi )(x(a
L
i + 1)), ∀k ∈ Ai \ {a
L
i }.
Case 4: k = cLi+1 = aUi + 1. Note that ϑ(cLi+1) = 0 and ϑ(cLi+1 − 1) = 1. By Case 4 in Part 1,
it holds that
VN−s(cLi+1)(x(c
L
i+1 + 1)) ≤ ρN
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s(cLi+1−1)
(1 + αℓ)VN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(c
L
i+1)).
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The combination of the above four relations renders the following:
VN−s(cLi+1)(x(c
L
i+1 + 1)) ≤ ρN
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s(cLi+1−1)
(1 + αℓ)VN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(c
L
i+1))
= ρN
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s(cLi+1−1)
(1 + αℓ)VN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(a
U
i + 1))
≤ ρN
aUi −a
L
i∏
ℓ=2
ρN−ℓ
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s(cLi+1−1)
(1 + αℓ)VN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(a
L
i + 1))
≤ ρNρN−1
aUi −a
L
i∏
ℓ=2
ρN−ℓ
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s(cLi+1−1)
(1 + αℓ)VN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(a
L
i ))
= ρNρN−1
aUi −a
L
i∏
ℓ=2
ρN−ℓ
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s(cLi+1−1)
(1 + αℓ)VN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(c
U
i + 1))
≤ γˆN,SVN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(c
L
i )),
where the four inequalities sequentially apply Cases 4 to 1. Since γˆN,S ∈ (0, 1), the subsequence
{VN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(c
L
i+1))} exponentially decreases.
By the above four cases, it is not difficult to verify that the following holds for all k ∈
Ai ∪ Ci \ {c
L
i }:
VN−s(k−1)(x(k)) ≤ max{ρN−1, 1}ρN max
s∈{2,··· ,S}
s∏
ℓ=2
ρN−ℓ
N−1∏
ℓ=N−s(cL
i+1−1)
(1 + αℓ)VN−s(cLi+1−1)(x(c
L
i )).
Hence, the whole sequence {VN−s(k−1)(x(k))} diminishes. It establishes the asymptotical stabil-
ity.
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